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The Right-Wing Perspective: Populist Frames and Agenda on Facebook in Central and Eastern Europe

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Abstract: Political and public debates unfolding online provide various spaces for interaction between political actors, citizens and media outlets. This environment can be employed for diverse agendas, frames and biases, especially within populist narratives. This work examines the discourse of Central and Eastern European right-wing populists from Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland (2015–2021). To identify discursive patterns within public Facebook posts (n=192,057) by 31 party, movement and partisan news media pages, created by API interrogation, right-wing discourse is analyzed through semi-automated quantitative content analysis based on text mining, in conjunction with qualitative content analysis of messages that generated the highest engagement-rates (n=80). Key findings indicate both national and international narrative patterns with a focus on political, social and ethnic opponents, by incorporating Engesser et al.'s (2017) core elements of right-wing populist discourse within Master Populist Frame building (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017), thus marking the contemporary agenda of European right-wing discourse.

Keywords: Social media, alternative media, populism, right-wing

INTRODUCTION

Political communication has been reshaped considering new media, Web 2.0 and the social web. Information, ideology, opinion and a broad variety of contents can be easily engaged with and disseminated by millions of people from all over the world. Different formats and types can be accessed on websites, dedicated to various ideologies, news sites and their applications, or through social media, which also offer producers and consumers a much livelier and interactive environment, enabling political actors (politicians and parties) to directly interact with voters or audiences (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012). “Networked digital media technologies are extending the ability of news consumers to both create

and receive personalized social news streams” (Herminda et al., 2012, p. 821), highlighting the observed success of right-wing populists (RWPs) in both traditional and digital media in recent years (Wodak, 2015).

The structure and social character of these services allow content producers easy access to large audiences, thus bypassing traditional news media. Especially parties, alternative and partisan news media and social movements have discovered and profited from these tools and channels, generating and interacting with larger audiences (Holt et al., 2019; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). This highlights the idea of networking among right-wing groups in civil society and the organized political sphere within Web 2.0 and digital media infrastructure (Druxes & Simpson, 2015). These networks of Euro-sceptics, critics of immigration and refugees, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments, mixed with conspiracy theories (Mazzoleni, 2018), can be found at the core of anti-establishment narratives, creating political in-groups, as opposed to out-groups, resulting in an ‘us-versus-them’ discourse (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).

The proposed research considers not only political actors but also partisan media, activists and movements, given the pursuit of influence over policy (Eberwein et al., 2015) and applies an actor-centric approach, mapping a large spectrum of actors involved in political communication. This includes written social media contents of various RWP actors as a contemporary arena of discourses. Similar studies have examined shorter periods with broad topic modelling approaches on European and US far-right networks (Schroeder, 2019), mapped the main topics addressed by specific parties and movements on Facebook (Stier et al., 2017), examined alternative or right-wing news media (Boberg et al., 2020) or specific politicians (Berti, 2020; Lipiński & Stępińska, 2018). More constrained and western international contexts have been examined (Klein & Muis, 2018), as well as the RWP party agenda on Facebook during the European Elections (Heft et al., 2022), far right networks (Caiani et al., 2012) and topic-based networks (Ahmed et al., 2020).

The present study aims at determining frames within discursive patterns of several types of RWP actors involved in agenda setting, proposing a new approach by operationalizing core elements of right-wing discourse (Engesser et al., 2017) within frame building stages (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017). The study addresses an underexplored geographical context by comparing social media communication in Central and Eastern Europe over a period of six years in four countries, analyzing network agenda of parties, movements and partisan news media within an extensive data sample (192,057 Facebook posts) published between January 1st 2015 and December 31st 2021.

This research employs a mixed method analysis of content and publishing activity, with the purpose of conducting a national and international comparison between actors identified in the data sample. The aim here is to hone-in on right-wing

populist narratives and determine whether a common agenda and recurrent narratives and frames exist between actors from various spheres of public life and across countries. In order to understand the scale of right-wing populist endeavors and publishing activity regarding key events, this study's quantitative analysis provides the numbers-based context, while the qualitative analysis will further exemplify and broaden the image.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Agenda setting and agenda building theory outline the focus on certain issues in terms of attention (Elder & Cobb, 1984), and public perception, exposure and reception (Rössler, 2013). Media audiences' reception of such topics can be further influenced by online media consumption, possibly contributing to fragmented audiences (Brubaker, 2008). Social media analysis allows for a certain degree of audience perception, by analyzing messages with high engagement and distribution (reactions and shares). Politicians and parties can be their own agenda setters through steadily evolving new media products and channels, bypassing news media filters (Siapera, 2017), or by creating a general agenda through censorship or control (Lindgren, 2022) such as in Poland or Hungary (Surowiec et al., 2019).

Guo (2016) defines three levels of agenda-setting: 1) prioritizing objects of importance; 2) creating attributions or characteristics attached to them; and 3) the creation of networks relating those objects and characteristics. At the third level, Guo's Network Agenda Setting is a pertinent concept for analysis, as it applies to both news media and political actors, so that certain issues can serve as indicators for the latter (Guo & Vargo, 2015). Immigration for instance could be prioritized and presented as a pressing, urgent issue, as incompatible in terms of language, culture or identity and, as a reoccurring narrative, directly associated with far-right actors.

Network Agenda Setting analysis also allows for the most dominant subjects are tracked based on codes that include issues and their attached attributions, thus mapping how these are interconnected in both national and transnational narratives. In a similar context, Hunt et al. (1994) merge frames with group identity. They identify key agenda setting figures (protagonists: RWP politicians, activists), the collective *we*, and opponents (antagonists: elites, opposition parties and politicians, government). They also identify the citizen audiences who can be convinced of the right cause. Later research points towards right-wing network agenda through prioritization (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2018), and frequency of coverage and the perception of those elements as connected can lead to issue ownership, resulting in further interrelatedness of issues and actors (Guo & Vargo, 2015). This study endeavors to examine the relationships

between categories of narratives and frames. Cases of issue ownership by far-right actors can be their frequently addressed topics, such as immigration, refugees (Mazzoleni, 2018), Euro-skepticism (Abts et al., 2016) or national, ethnic and cultural identity (Hentges et al., 2014).

Frames can describe the orientation of an issue in terms of representation enabling political actors to encourage their potential electorate to perceive these issues in a specific way (Chong & Druckmann, 2007). Such frames can function as mechanisms, triggering a specific understanding of an issue (Scheufele & Tewskbury, 2009). Ideologically, they can serve as symbols or identifiers within certain narratives (Zald, 1996). The *Master Populist Frame* (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017) provides a suitable adaptation in terms of framing analysis. Here, three stages are defined by referencing a collective under threat (first stage), defining the source of the threat, like ethnic, social or political opponents, elites or institutions (second stage), and providing solutions, such as a promised liberation from such opponents (third stage). Nissen (2020) observes such mobilization frames (Snow & Benford, 1988) within movement actors. The study's use of a text-mining approach aims at identifying these collectives, threats and solutions by incorporating core elements of RWP discourse, and mapping the connection of the proposed codes.

RIGHT-WING POPULISTS AND THE MEDIA

Scholars dispute the understanding of populism, as appealing to fears and emotions (Priester, 2012), especially when it comes to the collective struggle of groups (Panizza, 2005) oppressed by certain elites and dangerous others in the fight for sovereignty, values and identity (Albertazzi & McDonnel, 2008; Reinemann et al., 2017). This highlights the emphasis on cultural, political, social or ethnic identity, yet ideologically flexible (Priester, 2012), “more fragmented, personalized and medially staged” (Puhle, 2003, p. 16). Five core elements of right-wing populist narratives and framing can be seen in “popular sovereignty, pure people, corrupt elite, and dangerous others”, as well as “the heartland” (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1111).

Globalization, immigration, and corruption mark core points of current right-wing populist narratives in Europe and the US (Mazzoleni, 2018), perceived as successful regarding exposure not only within traditional media but also digital media (Pajnik & Sauer, 2017). News media play an important role in incentivizing the success of populist actors (Wodak, 2015). Research has pointed towards an agenda around anti-Islam and anti-Refugee stances, Euro-skepticism and globalization (Abts et al., 2016), exemplified by parties such as Austria's FPÖ or France's Rassemblement National [formerly Le Front National] (Heinisch, 2004).

This connects to identity formation, most visibly within movements such as Generation Identity (GI), stemming from France but active also in Germany, Austria and Hungary. Their focus on “identity, ethno nationalism and liberation nationalism” (Hentges et al., 2014, p. 3) is reflected within mediated events and video productions of their actions, promoting civil protest and activism. Such movements portray themselves as victims of gender, sexual or ethnic minorities (Lewis, 2018), displaying a threatened homogeneous identity. Within such groups, a distinction can be seen between democratic radical right-wing actors, opposed to liberal ideals, and undemocratic extreme right-wing actors, with the radical right as the placeholder between the two (Mudde, 2007).

Concluding on reflections on populism, this work considers populism as a form of political communication (in line with master populist frames), in this case, of a right-wing nature, especially considering observations on Euro-skepticism, ethno nationalism, anti-immigration and Islam stances, paired with general observations on anti-elite and ‘us-versus-them’ narratives.

RIGHT-WING ALTERNATIVE AND PARTISAN NEWS MEDIA

Alternative media can be incorporated into the context of activism and partisan press, as the main goal is not to inform objectively but partially, through ideologically-infused content (Atton, 2007). Alternative media can share common characteristics with activist structures and movement communications (Wimmer, 2015), connecting alternative and general media skepticism (Haller et al., 2019). Criteria for alternative media can be seen in political contents and motives, such as truth and accuracy, non-commercial approaches to publication, content-based interaction with audience, a low profile in terms of paid editors, the creation of an alternative society, and networking within a broad landscape of various formats (Ladstätter, 2001; Schroeder, 2019).

Such media can be understood in their radical approach to specific topics but can be placed all over the political spectrum. Harcup (2012) exemplifies this with a less radical ethnic minority press and alternative realities created by more radical far-right organizations. These alternative media combine approaches used in brand influencing and social networking, establishing alternative news and financial success. As such, alternative media encompasses anti-mainstream, anti-elitist contents and attitudes, which can also be seen as “self-appointed correctives of traditional media” (Haller & Holt, 2019, p. 1666), even defining the public discourse and agenda (Frischlich et al., 2020). Consequently, the term partisan (news) media will be used for the included media organizations in this research, as the terminology alternative media is too generalized.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMMUNICATION

Social movements are a “means of organizing for social change” (Staggenborg, 2016, p. 4). Scholars have identified general movements, aiming at general values, and specific social movements, concerned with clear objectives of change, which are observable within political and social movements rhetoric (Blumer, 1995; Cathcart, 1972). Right-wing social movements act as key sources of interest for news media (Virchow, 2017), especially their representatives such as Lutz Bachmann (PEGIDA), Martin Sellner (GI), Paweł Kukiz or Robert Bąkiewicz (Poland).

In Germany, social movements like PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident), Generation Identity and the political party AfD show strong overlaps (Rucht, 2017). In the case of PEGIDA, Haller and Holt (2019) observe media attention for the movement, yet a communication almost exclusively via social media, exemplifying Chadwick’s (2013) ‘hybrid media system’, bypassing traditional media, yet obtaining sufficient attention to gain exposure and public attention. PEGIDA exemplifies the importance of social media for movements, as the group originates from a Facebook community (Haller & Holt, 2019). As the conjunction of right-wing alternative media and social movements has already been examined earlier in this work, political parties can also profit from attention that topics gain, which are communicated by social movements (Stier, et al., 2017).

In the case of right-wing social movements, some even make use of symbolism and similarities. PEGIDA, for instance, adapted the *Montagsdemos* (Monday protests), popular prior to the fall of the GDR, even using the slogan ‘we are the people’ (wir sind das Volk), online and offline (Richardson-Little & Merrill, 2020). Polish groups such as *Młodzież Wszechpolska* (All-Polish Youth), *Roty Marszu Niepodległości* (Independence March) and their key figure Robert Bąkiewicz adapt symbolism around Polish resistance during World War II. The research at hand considers social movements as groups with no direct implication in policy making, but rather indirect, through street protests and activism. Social movement communication not only serves or stems from cultural memory but also consists in mobilization, organizing of events and rallies, spreading ideas, ideology and narratives (Cammaerts, 2015), further perpetuated by partisan media discourse.

METHODOLOGY

The proposed research aims to analyze narratives generated by RWP partisan media, political actors, and social movements from Central and Eastern Europe (Table 1), to establish what their frames are and determine the larger agenda behind narratives and frames. Furthermore, the scope is to compare findings on national levels and draw conclusions on an international level, which might help towards understanding the internationalization of right-wing populists in Europe and explore a possible network of similar narratives and its shape under different national circumstances.

Facebook use lies at 58% in Austria, 81% in Hungary, 70% in Poland , and 41% in Germany (Newman et al., 2022), and represents a highly relevant platform for the analysis of narratives and activities of actors. Considering the platform’s high usage for news consumption in Hungary (60%) and Poland (49%), mapping the adjacent news media discourse can provide important insights on how discursive patterns are constructed. Besides a thorough literature review, the political relevance of parties by representation in parliaments and election results, the size of movement events, the distribution numbers for media organizations, as well as numbers of followers on Facebook were considered during sampling.

Table 1. Facebook pages by country, actor and followers, anglicized nomenclature, type, of actor and number of documents (number of posts featuring written text)

Country	Actor (followers)	Translation	Type	N of Documents
Austria	FPÖ (183,841)	Freedom Party Austria	Party	8,240
	PEGIDA Graz (8,335)	PEGIDA Graz	Movement	5,744
	PEGIDA Österreich (4,125)	PEGIDA Austria	Movement	5,672
	PEGIDA Wien (14,959)	PEGIDA Vienna	Movement	5,962
	Unzensuriert.at (59,176)	Uncensored	Media	12,185
	Wochenblick (79,910)	Weekly view	Media	428
	ZackZack (34,768)	ZackZack	Media	4,665
	Total			42,896
Germany	AfD (544,459)	Alternative for Germany	Party	4,761
	Blaue Narzisse (8,953)	Blue Daffodil	Media	2,540
	Hallo Meinung (141,701)	Hello Opinion	Media	2,865
	Junge Freiheit (130,194)	Young Freedom	Media	12,022
	LEGIDA (3,542)	PEGIDA Leipzig	Movement	5,311
	PEGIDA Berlin (4,029)	PEGIDA Berlin	Movement	3,948
	Sezession (5,443)	Secession	Media	1,362
	Total			32,809

Country	Actor (followers)	Translation	Type	N of Documents
Hungary	Civil Összefogás Fórum (26,429)	Civil Solidarity Forum	Movement	1,310
	Fidesz (338,454)	Alliance of Young Democrats	Party	8,760
	Magyar Demokrata Hetilap (55,333)	Hungarian Democratic Weekly	Media	11,648
	Magyar Idők (51,700)	Hungarian Times	Media	12,184
	Magyar Nemzet (25,800)	Hungarian Nation	Media	5,225
	Total			
Poland	Bądźmy Razem, TVP (687,491)	Let's be Together TVP	Media	6,347
	Kukiz 15 (245,427)	Kukiz 15	Party/ Movement	8,058
	Media Narodowe (21,902)	National Media	Media	1,170
	Młodzież Wszechpolska (49,534)	All-Polish Youth	Movement	3,279
	Nasz Dziennik (16,156)	Our Journal	Media	6,030
	Paweł Kukiz (357,763)	Pawel Kukiz	Movement	5,338
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (314,514)	Law & Justice	Party	7,033
	Radio Maryja (123,234)	Radio Maria	Media	12,104
	Robert Bąkiewicz (46,557)	Robert Bakiewicz	Movement	1,202
	Roty Marszu Niepodległości (20,738)	Independence March	Movement	2,409
	Tygodnik Lisickiego (101,529)	Lisicki's weekly	Media	12,119
	wPolityce.pl (104,089)	wPolitics	Media	12,136
Total				77,225

Studies conducted broad topic modelling approaches on European and US far-right networks, mapped main subjects addressed by specific parties and movements on Facebook or examined right-wing news media specifically. Therefore, this research asks: How do frames integrate into discursive patterns within the agenda-setting process of RWP actors (RQ1)? Considering this, the study proposes a new methodological approach by combining and operationalizing the core elements of right-wing discourse within the frame building stages proposed by Heinisch and Mazzoleni (2017).

Based on such discursive patterns, an analysis of possible common agenda was conducted. Research has studied political parties' agenda on Facebook during key events, specific politicians, or compared right-wing agenda in specific European countries with the US (Heft et al., 2022; Berti, 2020; Schroeder, 2019). The Eastern European context remains neglected regarding social media case studies. The study asks: How does contemporary right-wing agenda compare between the four Central and Eastern European countries from 2015 until 2021 (RQ2)?

Lastly, studies have addressed right-wing networks and network agenda in different international contexts, within smaller sample size and on different

platforms (Ahmed et al., 2020; Caiani et al., 2012). However, the present research aims at examining a possible network agenda, not the network per se. Therefore, this research asks: How do common discursive patterns and frames integrate into a possible transnational network agenda (RQ3)?

The data consists of public Facebook posts (2015-2021) acquired through API interrogation, using Facepager, and includes the initial message of the post, the date, number of comments, shares and reactions, and was collected on February 7th and 8th, 2022.

A semi-automated quantitative data analysis (text mining) was conducted on the posts' contents (Higuchi, 2016). The software (KH Coder) filtered the contents, excluding stopwords for each language. The remaining corpus was analyzed based on tokenized term frequency and position within the corpus. This facilitates term frequency analysis, words co-occurrence networks, and code co-occurrences and cross tabs. Codebooks were prepared and adapted for each country. Results were validated through concordance/text view, which helped map the contents into narrative categories (Table 3) by establishing codes for *Actors* and *Issues* (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011), based on an approach of conducting an analysis of right-wing discourse in Germany and Italy. Table 3 provides an overview of subjects for the codes, based on topic-specific literature (see annex for coding sheets). A qualitative content analysis was conducted on the top ten rankings of posts by engagement (N=80), which was used to map narratives and frames (based on user interaction numbers) and compare those to the findings of the text mining analysis to validate the quantitative analysis results.

Table 2. Discursive fields for semi-automated quantitative analysis with codes


Actors		Issues	
Us, we	Migrants	Referendum, voting	History
The people	Refugees	EU integration	Culture, Language, Tradition
Right-wing populist actors	Sinti & Roma	Terror	Security, border, protection
Demonym (common term)	Jews	Violence, criminality	Truth, disinformation
Citizens	Muslims	Generational issues	Debt
They (the others)	Homeless	Family	Guilt
Foreigners	LGBTQ	Religion	COVID pandemic
Domestic politicians (opposition)	International institutions	Dictatorship	Restrictions
The media	NGO	Homeland	
Business	The church		

Actors encompass the in-group, RWP key figures, organizations and the people, but also the out-group, such as political, social and ethnic adversaries, opposition politicians and civil society groups or national/international organizations and institutions. Issue fields show contemporary politics topics and right-wing discourse: the homeland, borders and sovereignty or culture and traditions. These elements will provide the basis for a further analysis of frames that could help determine a possible national/international agenda when comparing all actors.

FINDINGS

Publishing activity (Figure 1) during political events reveals sharp increases in output during the “refugee crisis” (2015-2016), with a high level of activity in Austria, Hungary and Poland. During the 2016 “UK Independence Referendum” period, which marks an international trigger, posting increased in Germany, Hungary and Poland. Another activity-relevant temporal context was given by the EU Elections (2019), spiking increases in all countries. The COVID-19 pandemic beginnings generated increasing publishing numbers in Germany, Hungary and Poland but also in Austria towards the end of 2020.

Figure 1. Publishing activity by country 2015-2021, showing increased output during the ‘refugee crisis’ (Poland, Austria, Hungary), the Brexit campaign and referendum (Poland, Hungary, Germany), EU Parliamentary Elections (all countries) and the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (all countries).




Source: Author

THE MASTER POPULIST FRAMES

COLLECTIVE UNDER THREAT

In all four national contexts, references to the collective, the people and ordinary citizens, us-and-we narratives and RWP key actors can be found. Narratives referencing these identity actors are predominantly used by all three types of pages, except for Poland (Figure 5) where *Nasz Dziennik* (Our Journal) and *Bądźmy Razem. TVP* (Let's be together, TVP) show only a small number of references to these identity actors. This component of the collective further connects the narratives about the homeland and the people in the first stage of the frame.

Figure 2. Cross tab of discursive fields by actors and issues, Austria. Identity actors, ethnic adversaries and oppositional actors are frequently connected. Results indicate a demonym and homeland frame, connected to political adversaries and right-wing actors.



Source: Author

SOURCE OF THREAT


In line with the *Master Populist Frame*, the source of perceived threats is attached to the collective. The different findings on each national level indicate that for German and Austrian actors, ethnic adversaries (i.e., foreigners, migrants, refugees, Muslims) and oppositional actors (i.e., ethnic adversaries, homeless, LGBTQ, political adversaries, the media, businesses) are the main target for the

SOLUTIONS

Regarding solutions, Austrian narratives (Figure 2) frame building connects collectives and in-groups with the threat. Actors propose solutions such as caps on immigration numbers and refugees to be allowed into the country and a strong stance against immigration into Austria. Where former governing parties ÖVP and SPÖ are framed as threats towards the financial wellbeing of citizens, FPÖ promises tax cuts. Another frame within the COVID-19 pandemic displays government and vaccine mandates as a threat to ordinary citizens. Solutions here are warnings, calls for demonstrations and vaccination refusal by RWP actors or COVID-19 skeptic doctors such as Sucharit Bhagdi.

German actors (Figure 3) similarly frame migration and refugees. National sovereignty and safety of citizens are pitched against government and ruling parties, which are responsible for poor regulation of migration and asylum. The solution offered by AfD calls for easier deportation of refugees, lighter classification of safe countries of origin and caps on immigration. Within framing of oppositional actors, a strong focus on former government parties CDU/ CSU and SPD can be observed, as well as key figures like former chancellor Merkel.

Figure 4. Cross tab of discursive fields by actors and issues, Hungary. Oppositional actors, political adversaries and identity actors are frequently connected. Domestic politicians are placed within narratives involving us/we discourse, the demonym and the people. The homeland is closely referenced alongside right-wing actors.




Source: Author

In Hungary (Figure 4), frame building works similarly in terms of topics. Actors use Europe, Hungary and the people as a collective under threat by refugees and migration. This is described as population and economic migration. Immigrants and refugees are described as militant and perilous. Proposed solutions are open and uncensored dialogue, where it would be possible to call migration and refugee movements towards Europe a crisis, abandoning political correctness. Actors call for stricter regulations as well. Actors frequently addressed, as the source

of the threat, are liberals, opposition politicians and the EU. Similar frames are observable with regular migration, where Muslim immigrants are pitched against European citizens and described as violent and perilous. Actors see Western democracies under threat by their Muslim populations within a war-like narrative, that is further compared to the demise of Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Frame building in Poland (Figure 5) follows similar structures. Right-wing politicians identify the “refugee crisis” and immigration as subjects marking a threat. Threat sources are political adversaries, like Civic Platform, their chairman Donald Tusk and the Polish People’s Party, who are displayed as accepting immigrants into Poland. Actors like Pawel Kukiz or PiS present themselves as the solution, proposing anti-immigration policies. This type of frame building can also be found for the EU and European Council, which are perceived as the source for this threatening migration, as well as rule-of-law procedures, which are seen as threatening to national sovereignty. Solutions are presented with Polish right-wing politicians opposing these EU mechanisms.

Figure 5. Cross tab of discursive fields by actors and issues, Poland. Identity actors and RWP actors frequently appear together, connected to a larger field evolving around the demonym. Media appear alongside other adversaries, connected to narratives about the homeland and oppositional actors.



Source: Author

POSTS WITH MOST ENGAGEMENT

Austrian posts with highest engagement refer to government actors and political adversaries, for instance “wrong left turn”, left-wing government coalitions of conservative and green parties. Actors are named as well, like former Austrian chancellor Kurz or vice-chancellor Kogler, who are perceived as lying to Austrians and insulting them. Messages describe lying and deceiving and failing government. Several posts attack government actors or parties over COVID-19 measures and vaccine mandates. The FPÖ states that “[w]hat the black-green government has done in recent weeks is more than shabby. The ongoing fear and panic mongering has really frightened many people”. They claim that “[t]he government has really failed completely on all levels and lied to and cheated the Austrians – EVERYONE, the vaccinated, the recovered and the unvaccinated” and further set the country or the people in opposition to the government. One of the most shared posts mentions mainstream media in Germany. These posts follow a similar frame-building as observed within the text-mining analysis. Government and political opposition are identified as a threat to the people (the Austrians), whereas RWP actors promise salvation from their dangerous policies.

In Germany, some posts reference powerful, political elites and the media. Partisan news media *Hallo Meinung* rules in autocratic fashion by pooling mainstream media and politics. Posts deal with immigration and refugees, AfD stating that “the invasion has begun” and depicting a “[d]eclaration of war on Europe”. Other posts include government actors, like former chancellor Merkel, former ministers Seehofer and Maas. Two AfD posts mention Merkel alongside anti-COVID-19 measures, stating that “Merkel wants Mega-Shutdown” and is “more and more radical”. They criticize Bavarian prime-minister Söder for making “Islam [a] school subject”. *Junge Freiheit* references right-wing key actors like AfD’s Alice Weidel, Georg Pazderski and former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski (PiS), who is mentioned over anti-immigration stances. Frame themes are slightly different compared to Austria. Perceived threats are immigration and refugees, which are taken as one and the same concept, connected to government officials, allegedly furthering this threat towards the people. The media are tied to the source of the threat as well. Another difference is the stronger focus on RWP key actors from AfD, which suggests a personality cult within the solutions of frame building.

Hungarian actors frequently reference immigration and refugees. They refer to Hungary as not being an immigrant country, connecting prominent figures like George Soros to the issue and Hungarian prime minister Orbán as a defender. One Forum post states that “Soros’ people would turn Hungary into a country of immigrants, so now we have to stand up for our country again”, framing elites against the people. Other Fidesz messages address political adversaries, such as the left and Ferenc Gyurcsány, stating that “the left-wing coalition still

supports migration. The only reason they don't advertise at home is that they are pro-immigration, because you wouldn't be able to win an election with that". Another case is Ildikó Borbély (Hungarian Socialist Party), who "called all Fidesz supporters rats. Let's remember this on May 26, when we vote!" or Budapest mayor Gergely Karácsony, who is portrayed as part of the left wing, supporting immigration. Posts frequently reference the homeland, connected to Fidesz and Orbán, opposed to a group of political adversaries and elites. These messages feature similar frame components as the German posts. Immigration and refugees are displayed as a threat to Hungary and the people. RWP government seem to require other sources of threat must be named, which can be found in Soros, and opposition politicians, which shows that even when in governing positions, right-wing populists resort to the opposition and international adversaries, in order to frame threats. Like Germany-specific frames, a personality cult can be observed within the frequent referencing of Orbán as the liberator.

Polish pages like those of Pawel Kukiz frequently aim at government party PiS over increasing prices, demands over tax cuts or, in combination with the Polish party Civic Platform (PO), budgets and Poland's role in Europe. Activist Robert Bąkiewicz's page frequently references the left in opposition to church and religion, portraying the left as "satanists" and rioters, connecting this to the EU. He calls "[d]on't be afraid of Brussels! Take action against aggressors who want to plunder our temples", framing the EU as supportive of violence against religious institutions. The PiS' posts feature party chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Kaczyński, portrayed amongst Polish flags, supported by visuals emphasizing what party and politicians have achieved. Parties emphasize their connection to the Polish state and people, as well as the homeland narrative. Polish posts mark a difference to the other countries, as populists also target each other like Pawel Kukiz and PiS. Kukiz for instance states that "[e]verything will take place during a hastily convened session of the Sejm, so that Poles do not have time to realize that PiS is making a jump to the money!", displaying PiS as corrupt elites, talking about "the hypocrisy of PiS versus Kukiz's fight against the privileges of politicians". Frame building shows similarities, as party elites (PiS, PO), international institutions (EU), and the political opposition (the left) are identified as the source of jeopardy. Threats are presented as not just economically detrimental towards citizens, but also, considering the religious narratives, as socially and culturally invasive and damaging. The PiS frames their work in a manner to identify them as accomplished, surrounded by national symbolism.

CONCLUSIONS

Quantitative content analysis revealed similarities when comparing the different actors. Right-wing populists in different countries are frequently tied to narratives about the homeland, identity actors and the people. In contrast, another field consists of political and ethnic adversaries, oppositional actors and international institutions. *The Master Populist Frame* could be exemplified within all national contexts and the results clearly indicate a common agenda in terms of narratives and frame construction, especially for international institutions, government and opposition actors, as well as migration and refugees. These frame components happen in conjunction with the core elements of RWP discourse, serving as a basis for subjects within frame building, suggesting a network of mutual support of movements and partisan media for RWP policies and politicians. This implies that contemporary right-wing populist discourse is preoccupied with topics that can be adapted for national and transnational contexts. This is especially relevant in the case of the four countries included in this study, as international institutions and politicians are frequently part of the framing process of these actors, as well as adversaries that are portrayed alongside the framed agenda of these institutions.

Qualitative analysis of the best performing posts in terms of engagement shows that in all countries, political adversaries and governmental actors were dominant targets, through the mentioning of politicians and portraying of policy that is opposed to RWP beliefs. In Austria and Germany these targets comprise of former and current chancellors, ministers, and opposition parties and politicians. In Hungary these targets consist of opposition politicians without decisive functions, as Fidesz is in government, yet also international actors like George Soros and the EU serve as sources of threat. In Poland, activist frames predominantly target the left whereas Kukiz predominantly targets PiS, personified by Jarosław Kaczyński. In Germany and Hungary, some posts point towards illegal immigration and refugees, which are connected to political adversaries or international institutions. The analysis of discourse in Austria, Hungary and Poland shows emphasis on connecting RWP actors (personality cult) with narratives evolving around the homeland and the people. In Hungary and Poland, social movement messages gain high user engagement, indicating a successful communication in terms of subjects and target audience, especially when compared to Germany and Austria. In the case of the former, results show that Polish and Hungarian movements were direct and clear in communicating who perceived opponents were (EU, George Soros, Immigrants, leftists), which appears to appeal to their online audiences. Seeing as the analysis of narratives within the most engaging posts confirm the quantitative content analysis findings, a practical implication of the proposed approach lies within its methodological applicability.

Furthermore, this study's approach and findings highlight a predominance of transnational frames, which are adapted using country or context specific motives such as specific actors (opponents, politicians, institutions, out-groups) or issues (migration, asylum, protests, policy).

The results suggest that not only do national and domestic frames exist, those shared by all types of actors, but so do international ones with similarities found in all countries mapped. This suggests the possibility of right-wing echo chambers in online media being created by a network of actors. Moreover, this plays into the discussion for cyberbalkanization and the emergence or cultivation of fragmented audiences and filter bubbles, as a network of actors effectively constructs similar national and transnational frames. These might ultimately result in a "confirmation bias" (Ludwig, 2018, p. 83) within a homogenous ecosystem of information issued by political actors, partisan media and social movements, consumed by users. The findings further point towards an international cooperation of right-wing actors from various countries, which would signify a follow-up to offline activities like the FPÖ congress in Vienna (2015), or the conference of European right-wing party officials in Germany (2017). This is further exemplified by increased posting activity during international events, like the "refugee crisis" or Brexit. Of the core elements defined by Engesser et al. (2017), the present study's mapped narratives evolve around all five of them. The people, corrupt elites (political adversaries, government actors) and dangerous others (immigrants, refugees, left-wing actors, ethnic or oppositional adversaries) were all part of references to specific individuals or collectives. The homeland appears in close connection to identity and RWP actors alongside national sovereignty in the light of immigration or international institutions. Frame building corresponds with the components of the *Master Populist Frame*.

These findings suggest a common agenda of mutually supportive actors by mentioning key figures and topics. Frequent referencing of topics such as globalization, immigration or corruption, mentioning a homogenous people, as connected to ideas of nationality and identity, opposed to elites or out-groups, institutions or issues like immigration, marks the narrative and agenda of contemporary European right-wing discourse. The present study's findings show that the operationalization of the core elements of right-wing discourse as components within the building of the *Master Populist Frame* prove as an effective methodological tool for the analysis of frames and agenda for a variety of actors and international contexts. This tool and the results can be of further interest to research preoccupied with political communication in various social media, as it adds to comparability between platforms, types of speech and formats of frames. The results address the gap in a broad field of literature and research mostly preoccupied with western RWP actors and discourse, adding insights on far-right social media communication in Central and Eastern Europe.

Further research could employ this methodological approach when mapping the development of narratives over time, setting them into the context of socio-political events, like the “refugee crisis”, Brexit, COVID-19, or European Elections, as shown by the present research. This type of analysis could provide insightful results in terms of frame construction over time and how components of the *Master Populist Frame* are completed. Future research could also investigate the connection of formats and frames, as this approach focuses on written text. Especially within social media, the analysis of native and user-generated content might clarify similarities, differences or additions in frame building.

This research approach has certain limitations. For a more thorough analysis based on codes, a good understanding of the various national socio-political contexts is crucial, as well as language skills, yet coding certain narrative fields proves difficult when it comes to language-specific phrasing, as well as special words for certain subjects (i.e., Lügenpresse in German as a term for lying or untruthful media). Furthermore, the analysis of posts based on user engagement (reactions and shares) only provides limited results, as online and social media audiences cannot be verified, nor validated in terms of authenticity, which is why these results must be understood in context backed up with more in-depth analysis.

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ANNEX

Table 3. Codes Austria

Actors		Issues	
<p>Us, we Wir uns</p>	<p>Migrants Migrant immigrant einwanderer Einwanderung Zuwanderer Zuwanderung migration</p>	<p>Referendum, voting Referendum volksentscheid wahl wahl+des+volkes wahlen urne wahlurne</p>	<p>History Geschichte historisch vergangenheit historische+wahrheit</p>
<p>The people volk nation</p>	<p>Refugees Fluchtling gefluchtete asylant asyl+suchende asyl flucht asyl Syrien Syrer</p>	<p>EU integration Europäische+integration diktat europaisches+diktat europaische+diktatur europaisches+gesetz europaische+gesetze europaisch</p>	<p>Culture, Language, Tradition Kultur kulturelle+wurzeln tradition unsere+traditionen sprache sprachlich unsere+sprache gemeinsame+sprache nationale+sprache landessprache deutsch</p>
<p>Right-wing populist actors fpo freiheitliche+partei strache hofer vilimsky hafenecker kickl</p>	<p>Sinti & Roma Zigeuner roma sinti</p>	<p>Terror Terror attentat attaque anschlag dschihad</p>	<p>Security, border, protection Sicherheit sicher Grenze Landesgrenze unsere+Grenzen Schutz beschutzen nationale+Sicherheit offene+Grenzen</p>
<p>Demonym (common term) osterreichisch die+osterreicher osterreichische+mitburger osterreich patriot echte+osterreicher echter+osterreicher</p>	<p>Jews Jude jüdisch</p>	<p>Violence, criminality Gewalt Kriminalität kriminell straffällig brutal bosartig grauenhaft verletzen verletzt</p>	<p>Truth, disinformation wahr desinformation falsche+information falsch+informiert Lüge Lügner fake+news lügenpresse falschaussage</p>
<p>Citizens Bürger staatsangehörigkeit unsere+bürger osterreicher bundesbürger burgerinnen</p>	<p>Muslims Muslim islam sharia muslimisch muslima Moschee minarett islamisierung dschihad mohammed</p>	<p>Generational issues Generation generationsunterschied die+alten die+jungen rentner altere+mitburger altere+bürger rente altersunterschied</p>	<p>Debt schulden wirtschaftliche +verschuldung wirtschaftskrise staatsschulden staatsverschuldung verschuldung</p>
<p>They (the others) Die+anderen ihre sie andere</p>	<p>Homeless Obdachlos</p>	<p>Family Familie Vater Mutter Kind traditionelle+Familie Familienwerte Oma Opa Eltern</p>	<p>Guilt Schuld tadel beschuldigen fehler tater tatervolk</p>

Actors		Issues	
<p>Foreigners Fremd auslander fremdlandisch</p>	<p>LGBTQ LGBT schwul lesbisch Lesbe transgender homosexuell gender sexuelle+identitat sexualisierung homosexualitat</p>	<p>Religion Religion religios glaube christlich jüdisch muslimisch islam religiöse+herkunft religiöse+wurzeln katholisch evangelisch protestant</p>	<p>COVID pandemic covid corona virus pandemie mask</p>
<p>Domestic politicians (opposition) spo ovp neos JETZT rendi-wagner brauner bures drozda Eibinger-Miedl Nehammer Woginger Sebastian+Kurz Meisl-Reisinger Scherak Stern Pilz</p>	<p>International institutions Eu europäische+union europäisches+parlament eu+parlament europäische+kommision Juncker Schulz von+der+leyen timmermans Tusk Mogherini UN vereinte+nationen migrationspakt migrationsabkommen</p>	<p>Dictatorship Diktatur autokrat herrschaft</p>	<p>Restrictions Verbot ausgangssperre restriktiv auflagen maßnahme</p>
<p>The media Medien mainstream+medien lügenpresse system+medien öffentlich+rechtlich rundfunk linke+medien medien+propaganda Presse TV Fernseher Zeitung Radio Nachrichten ORF</p>	<p>NGO Ngo nichtregierungsorganisation</p>	<p>Homeland heimat zuhause daheim bei+uns heimatland Österreich vaterland</p>	
<p>Business Unternehmen big+business internationale+unternehmen konzern großkonzern ausländische+unternehmen investoren ausländische+investoren</p>	<p>The church Kirche die+kirche vatican papst katholische+kirche evangelische+kirche</p>		

Table 4. Codes Germany

Actors		Issues	
Us, we Wir uns	Migrants Migrant immigrant einwanderer Einwanderung Zuwanderer Zuwanderung migration	Referendum, voting Referendum volksentscheid wahl wahl+des+volkes wahlen urne wahlurne	History Geschichte historisch vergangenheit historische+wahrheit
The people volk nation	Refugees Fluchtling gefluchtete asylant asyl+suchende asyl flucht asyl Syrien Syrer	EU integration Europäische+integration diktat europäisches+diktat europäische+diktatur europäisches+gesetz europäische+gesetze europäisch	Culture, Language, Tradition Kultur kulturelle+wurzeln tradition unsere+traditionen sprache sprachlich unsere+sprache gemeinsame+sprache nationale+sprache landessprache deutsch
Right-wing populist actors Afd alternative+fur+Deutschland Petry Gauland Weidel Meuthen von+storch Hocke	Sinti & Roma Zigeuner roma sinti	Terror Terror attentat attacke anschlag dschihad	Security, border, protection Sicherheit sicher Grenze Landesgrenze unsere+Grenzen Schutz beschutzen nationale+Sicherheit offene+Grenzen
Demonym (common term) deutsch die+deutschen deutsche+mitburger deutschland patriot echte+deutsche echter+deutscher	Jews Jude jüdisch	Violence, criminality Gewalt Kriminalität kriminell straffällig brutal bosartig grauenhaft verletzen verletzt	Truth, disinformation wahr desinformation falsche+information falsch+informiert Lüge Lügner fake+news lügenpresse fälschsausage
Citizens Bürger staatsangehörigkeit unsere+bürger deutscher bundesbürger bürgerinnen	Muslims Muslim islam sharia muslimisch muslima Moschee minarett islamisierung dschihad mohammed	Generational issues Generation generationsunterschied die+alten die+jungen rentner altere+mitburger altere+bürger rente altersunterschied	Debt schulden wirtschaftliche +verschuldung wirtschaftskrise staatsschulden staatsverschuldung verschuldung
They (the others) Die+anderen ihre sie andere	Homeless Obdachlos	Family Familie Vater Mutter Kind traditionelle+Familie Familienwerte Oma Opa Eltern	Guilt Schuld tadel beschuldigen fehler tater tatervolk
Foreigners Fremd ausländer fremdlandisch	LGBTQ LGBT schwul lesbisch Lesbe transgender homosexuell gender sexuelle+identität sexualisierung homosexualität	Religion Religion religios glaube christlich jüdisch muslimisch islam religiose+herkunft religiose+wurzeln katholisch evangelisch protestant	COVID pandemic covid corona virus pandemie mask

Actors		Issues	
<p>Domestic politicians (opposition) Merkel Seehofer Nahles Klingbeil Scholz Schulz Baerbock Habeck Lindner Kipping Riexinger LINKE links liberal linksliberal fdp grun die-grunen bundnis+90 spd sozialdemokraten cdu csu christdemokraten union</p>	<p>International institutions Eu europaische+union europaisches+parlament eu+parlament europaische+kommision Juncker Schulz von+der+leyen timmermans Tusk Mogherini UN vereinte+nationen migrationspakt migrationsabkommen</p>	<p>Dictatorship Diktatur autokrat herrschaft</p>	<p>Restrictions Verbot ausgangssperre restriktiv auflagen maBnahme</p>
<p>The media Medien mainstream+medien lugenpresse system+medien offentlich+rechtlich rundfunk linke+medien medien+propaganda Presse TV Fernseher Zeitung Radio Nachrichten ZDF ARD</p>	<p>NGO Ngo nichtregierungsorganisation</p>	<p>Homeland heimat zuhause daheim bei+uns heimatland Osterreich vaterland</p>	
<p>Business Unternehmen big+business internationale+unternehmen konzern groBkonzern auslanische+unernehmen investoren auslandische+investoren</p>	<p>The church Kirche die+kirche vatican papst katholische+kirche evangelische+kirche</p>		

Table 5. Codes Hungary

Actors		Issues	
<p>Us, we ,a+mi' mienk miénk nekünk nekünk bennünk minket hozzánk ránk mellénk belénk velünk tolünk nálunk rajtunk rólunk mieink</p>	<p>Migrants migráns bevándorló bevándorlás migráció bevándorolni</p>	<p>Referendum, voting választás népszavazás szavazás</p>	<p>History történelem történelmi múlt</p>
<p>The people emberek polgárok nép nemz</p>	<p>Refugees menekült menedékkérok bolondok+háza menedékkérogot+kérok Menedékkérok menekülni menedék menhely Szíria</p>	<p>EU integration európai+integráció ukáz diktátum európai+normák uniós+előírások Brüsszel</p>	<p>Culture, Language, Tradition kultúra kulturális kulturális+örökség hagyomány hagyományos hagyományaink nyelv nyelvünk nyelvi</p>
<p>Right-wing populist actors Orbán Fidesz Jobbik Gulyás Kubatov Németh Kocsis Vona Pongrácz</p>	<p>Sinti & Roma cigány roma sinti</p>	<p>Terror terror terrorista terrorista+támadás terroristátámadás dzsihá Iszlám+Állam terroristák támadás</p>	<p>Security, border, protection biztonság biztonsági biztonságos határ határok határvédelem határaink védelem védeni nemzetbiztonság</p>
<p>Demonym (common term) hazafi magyarok igazi+magyar magyar+nep emberek az+állam</p>	<p>Jews zsidó</p>	<p>Violence, criminality eroszak bunözés eroszakos törvénytelen törvénytelenül delikvens tettes elkövető brutális gonosz káros</p>	<p>Truth, disinformation igazság valóság igaz álhír hamis+hír megtévesztés hazugság hazugok</p>
<p>Citizens állampolgár polgár állampolgárság polgáraink</p>	<p>Muslims muzulmán muszlim iszlám saria sharia mecset minaret Iszlamizáció dzsihá</p>	<p>Generational issues generáció generációs+szakadék idosek fiatalok nyugdíjasok nyugdíjba+vonult életkori+szakadék életkori+távolság idos+emberek</p>	<p>Debt adósság államadósság gazdasági+válság</p>
<p>They (the others) ok oket nekik velük rájuk tolük hozzájuk náluk bennük rajtuk övék övéik róluk értük belőlük</p>	<p>Homeless homeless hajléktalan</p>	<p>Family család apa anya gyermekek hagyományos+család családi+értékek család+értékei nagyszülök szülök nagy Nagypapa</p>	<p>Guilt hibás felelos hibája hibájából felelőség felelősége</p>

Actors		Issues	
<p>Foreigners idegen külföldi Külföldiek</p>	<p>LGBTQ LGBT LMBT homokos buzi lesbikus leszbi homoszexuális melegek transz neme szexuális+identitás szexualizáció szexuális Biszexuálisok szexuális+forradalma különböző+nemu A+melegellenesség önazonossághoz+való+jogát szexualitást+öncélúan</p>	<p>Religion vallás vallásos hit keresztény keresztény zsidó muzulmán muszlim iszlám vallás+örökség keresztény+örökség katolikus evangéliumi protestáns</p>	<p>COVID pandemic covid koronavírus vírus világjárvány maszk</p>
<p>Domestic politicians (opposition) baloldal balos zöldek zöld+párt liberális libsi soros Magyar+Szocialista+Párt mszp Tóth Kunhalmi Párbeszéd +Magyarországért Karácsony Szabó Richárd+Barabás LMP Magyarország+Zöld+Pártja Kanász-Nagy Schmuck Keresztes Demokratikus+Koalíció DK Gyurcsány Csaba+Molnár</p>	<p>International institutions EU Európai+Unió Európai+Bizottság Európai+Parlament Európa+Parlament ENSZ Egyesült+Nemzetek migrációs+egyezmény migrációs+csomag menekültügyi+egyezmény Európai+Tanács</p>	<p>Dictatorship diktatúra autokrata szabály</p>	<p>Restrictions Ban kijárási+tilalom korlátozó kiadások intézkedéseket</p>
<p>The media a+média a+sajtó hazug+média hazug+sajtó baloldali+sajtó baloldali+média állami+televízió köztévé közmédia média+propaganda propagandaoldal Klubradio Szabad+Pecs index.hu RTL+Klub Atlatszo Direkt36 Szabolcs+Dull central+media Zoltán+Varga</p>	<p>NGO civilék nemkormányzati civil+szervezet Csóka- Szucs András+Kusinszki Stefánia+Kapronczay Társaság+a+Szabadságjogokért TASZ Eötvös+Károly Mérték+Médiaelemző+Muhely</p>	<p>Homeland Szülőföld otthon ittthon Magyarország</p>	
<p>Business vállalat befektető</p>	<p>The church egyház vatikán pápa</p>		

Table 6. Codes Poland

Actors		Issues	
Us, we My nas	Migrants migrant imigranci imigracj	Referendum, voting Referendum referendum wybór wybór+spośród+ludzi wybierz urna urna+wyborcza	History historia historyczne przeszłość historyczna+prawda
The people ludzie kraj kraj ojczyzna ojczyzna	Refugees uciekinię uciekł osoba+ubiegająca+się +o+ażył osoby+ubiegające+się +o+ażył przytułek ażył	EU integration Europejska+integracja dyktando europejskie+dyktando europejska+dyktatura prawo+europejskie europejskie+prawa europejski	Culture, Language, Tradition kultura kultura+korzenie tradycje nasze+tradycje język językowe nasz+język wspólny+język język+krajowy język+narodowy
Right-wing populist actors Prawo+i+Sprawiedliwość pis Kaczyński Duda Terlecki Kukiz Marcinkiewicz Tyszką Sachajko Żuk	Sinti & Roma Cygan Romowie sint	Terror terror zabójstwo atak+terrorystyczny atak	Security, border, protection Bezpieczeństwo pewnie granica Granica+państwa nasze+limity Ochrona chronić bezpieczeństwo+narodowe otwarte+granice
Demonym (common term) polski Polska obywatele+polscy patriota real+polska prawdziwy+biegun	Jews Żyd żydowski	Violence, criminality przemoc Przystępność przestępca przestępca brutalny złośliwy okropne boli ranny	Truth, disinformation prawda dezinformacja błędna+informacja źle+poinformowany kłamstwo kłamca fałszywe+wiadomości prasa+leżąca fałszywe+stwierdzenie
Citizens obywatel narodowość nasi+obywatele Polskie federalny obywatele obywatele+polscy	Muslims Muzułmanin Islam Szariat muzułmanin muzułmanin Meczeta minaret Islamizacja	Generational issues Pokolenia luka+pokoleniowa stary chłopcy emeryt starsze+burgery starsze+burgery emerytura różnica+wieku	Debt winien ekonomiczny+dług kryzys+gospodarczy dług+publiczny dług
They (the others) inni ich Ona	Homeless Bezdomny	Family rodzina ojciec matka dziecko tradycyjna+rodzina Wartości+rodzinne babcia dziadek rodzice	Guilt wina winić winić błąd tater ludzie+przestępczy

Actors		Issues	
<p>Foreigners Zagraniczny obcokrajowcy</p>	<p>LGBTQ LGBT wesoly lesbijka transpłciowy homoseksualny płec seksualna+tozsamość</p>	<p>Religion religia religijne uwierz Chrześcijański żydowski muzułmanin Islam religijne+pochozenie religijne+korzenie katolicki ewangelicki protestant</p>	<p>COVID pandemic covid koronawirus wirus pandemia maska corona korona</p>
<p>Domestic politicians (opposition) Tusk Lepper Olejniczak Kotlinowski Pawlak Platforma+Obywatelska PO Kierwiński Budka Grabiec Czarzasty Kwaśniewski Sojusz +Lewicy+Demokratycznej Nowa+Lewica Biedroń Socjaldemokracja+Polska SDPL Liga+Polskich+Rodzin LPR Giertych Bałażak</p>	<p>International institutions ue unia+europejska Parlament+europejski ue+parlament Komisja+europejska Juncker Schultz von+der+leyen Timmermans Kieł Mogherini ONZ zjednoczone+narody pakt+migracyjny umowa+migracyjna</p>	<p>Dictatorship dyktatura autokrata reguła</p>	<p>Restrictions Zakaz godzina+policyjna restrykcyjne edycje środki</p>
<p>The media Media mainstream+media prasa+do+lup system+media publiczne+prawne nadawanie lewo+media media+propaganda Naciśnij telewizja telewizja Gazeta radio Aktualności Gazeta+Wyborcza Dziennik+Gazeta+Prawna Puls+Biznesu Newsweek+Polska Polityka</p>	<p>NGO ngo organizacja+pozarządowa</p>	<p>Homeland strona+główna w+domu u+nas ojczyzna Polska ojczyzna</p>	
<p>Business duży+biznes firmy+międzynarodowe grupa duża+korporacja firmy+zagraniczne inwestorzy inwestorzy+zagraniczni</p>	<p>The church Kościół kościół watykan papież katolicki+kościół protestancki+kościół</p>		